India and CPEC

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a hot topic in the triangular politics of India china and Pakistam. India should or should not join, are equally strong options

To Join:

• India has already decided to join AIIB.if India could choose to join the AIIB, which may also ultimately fund some CPEC projects, then why avoid participating in that connectivity corridor?
• Another example is the Bangladesh China India Myanmar (BCIM) corridor. The intertwining BCIM and CPEC would contribute to optimizing the logic of India-China regional cooperation
• Further India should explore the possibility of CPEC being expanded with one of its branches including the Indian states of Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.The “trade utopia” via CPEC would be areality if India were integrated in the project.
• It would bevefit India, if Pakistan grants it overland access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
• The role of Russia in CPEC is also very importantRussia is inclined towards participating in the project. Fussia wanted to have a military exercise with Pakistan in POK but it later changed the venue.India needs to use Russia angle in its Indo Pak relations and cannot afford to develop a new bonhomie between pak and Russia,excludinf India.
• Within J&K, there is popular speculation on the potential advantages likely to accrue once CPEC is operationalised on the other side of the Line of Control (LoC). The idea of reviving the Silk Road on this side of the LoC and at some point linking it with the Chinese-led One Belt One Road (OBOR) has also been discussed. Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti recently invoked the pre-1947 “trans-Kashmir Corridor” and endorsed the revival of the ancient Silk Road as an “alternative to the CPEC”. Mufti also highlighted the significance of developing Kashmir as a nucleus of intra-regional trade and energy cooperation between South and Central Asia.
• It can lead to better Indo Pak ties due to economic implications and lead to more people to people contacts.

Not to Join:

• This is so because any Indian participation would inextricably be linked to the country’s legitimate claims on PoK.
• India shares a great deal of trust deficit with China and Pakistan and has a history of conflict with both. The issues of India with both remain as such and our security and military equations continue as sich and our countrymen would not support it when our civilians are killed vis terrorism in valley with pak support.
• That CPEC assets in PoK are not used militarily against India during war is a further source of concern for the security establishment and whether India should seek China’s assurance on the same forms an element of thinking in this category.
• CPEC rests on a Chinese plan to secure and shorten its supply lines through Gwadar with an enhanced presence in the Indian Ocean. an extensive Chinese presence will undermine India’s influence in the Indian Ocean. The possibility of a robust naval presence at a key location that may put China in “a commanding position at the mouth of the Gulf” in India’s perceived “home-ground” is fraught with implications for India.
• It is also being contended that if CPEC were to successfully transform the Pakistan economy that could be a “red rag” for India which will remain at the receiving end of a wealthier and stronger Pakistan.

To Conclude:

Currently, there is little that India can do to stall CPEC except for diplomatically articulating its objections and make it “un-implementable”. But it is unlikely that diplomatic statements alone will cause the project’s deferment.

India. It is argued that India should urge China to open up such links across the Indo-Tibetan belt instead of pinning hopes on connecting to CPEC.